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BOOK REVIEWS
An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, by
John Hick. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. xv and
412. Cloth, $35.00.

WILLIAM WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Hick's Gifford lectures bring together his reflections on religious epistemology and religious pluralism. Their publication provides an excellent opportunity for reassessing the thought of a philosopher who has made major
contributions to the discussion of both issues.
Part One contends that "the great world faiths" affirm that the possibility
of salvation/liberation "is grounded in reality." Part Two argues that "the
universe is religiously ambiguous in that it is possible to interpret it...both
religiously and naturalistically." (12)
Part Three is epistemological. Hick rehearses his case for claiming that "all
conscious experiencing is experiencing-as," and that there are three primary
"levels of interpretation ... physical, ethical and religious." Our cognitive freedom is greatest at the third level. "It is rationally appropriate," however, "for
those who experience their life in relation to the transcendent to trust their
own experience, together with that of the stream of religious life in which
they participate." (12-13)
Part Four raises the question of religious pluralism. Hick distinguishes
between the "Real-in-itself and the Real as humanly thought and experienced," and argues that all "experience of the transcendent is structured either
by the concept of deity... or by the concept of the absolute." These in tum are
"schematized in actual human experience" to produce the diversity of "divine
personae" and "metaphysical impersonae." "The function of religion in each
case," however, is to transform "human existence from self-centredness to
Reality-centredness." (14)
The fifth and final part is criteriological. Hick argues that "the basic criterion is soteriological; and the salvific transformation is most readily observed
by its moral fruits, which can be identified by means of the ethical ideal,
common to all the great traditions of agape/karuna (love/compassion)." (14)
When we apply this criterion, however, we find that the major religions are
equally successful in meeting it. There are no "impartial grounds," then, for
ranking one religion more highly than another. (3)
This is a thoughtful and stimulating book. It is also problematic. I will
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attempt to show this by discussing three central ideas-the world's religious
ambiguity, The Real-an- sich, and the "common ideal."
1. Hick believes that the universe is religiously ambiguous because "it is
capable from our present human vantage point of being thought and experienced in both religious and naturalistic ways." (73) The case for this is "made
by showing the inconclusiveness of the various philosophical arguments on
both sides." (75)
The world is genuinely ambiguous only if religious and naturalistic interpretations are equally plausible. Hick shows that the cases for both religious
and naturalistic interpretations of the facts aren't fulIy conclusive and that
other interpretations are possible. It doesn't follow that religious interpretations aren't more plausible than their rivals.
Why think that they aren't? Hick concedes that the theistic evidences "can
reasonably be said to point towards rather than away from a theistic worldview." (122f) Other evidence, however, "can reasonably be said to point away
from such a conclusion" (123) and there is no objective way of weighing the
comparative force of the competing considerations. Hick's response to those
who find a religious or naturalistic interpretation more plausible is that our
assessments of the evidence's weight are "arbitrary and sUbjective." (123)
Why should we believe this? Presumably because there are no grounds for a
religious or naturalistic interpretation which all informed and rational people
find compelling; no agreed upon standards on the basis of which one could
say that the case for one interpretation is stronger than the case for the other.
But Hick's ambiguity thesis is only partly based on his assessment of the
standard proofs and his implicit equation of objectivity with what would be
agreed upon by informed and rational people. It is also rooted in his "Kantianism." Hick believes that aJI experiencing is "experiencing-as." The world
as experienced is suffused with the meanings we have contributed to itphysical, ethical, and religious.
Given reality's structure and "the basic 'aim' of surviving and flourishing
as a living organism" (139), we are more or less compelled to ascribe the
physical meanings we do. Our cognitive freedom is minimal. We also have
a basic need "for that mutuality which is of the essence of personal wellbeing." It is thus "natural" that we should interpret others as persons, and
accept the moral claims which this recognition imposes upon us. (147) Our
cognitive freedom is greater in this case, however, because we can refuse to
recognize some individuals as persons and can evade unwelcome moral
claims. At the religious level, our cognitive freedom is even greater.
So what does the world's religious ambiguity consist in? The difficulty of
repelling skeptical challenges to common sense in a non-question begging
way suggests that-at the purely intellectual level-the world's physical and
moral ambiguity is nearly as great as its religious ambiguity. Of course most
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of us believe that the case for the physical and ethical interpretations of the
facts is stronger than the case against them. But isn't the fact that we are
more impressed by the arguments on one side of the issue an expression of
a strong disposition to construct the world in a certain way? And don't we
also have a need to interpret the world religiously? The "virtual universality
throughout human life of ideas and practices that are recognizably religious"
(21) suggests that we do.
The situation is this. If sound objective reasons are restricted to those which
would be recognized as such by all informed and rational people, there are
no purely intellectual grounds for asserting that the world's religious ambiguity is greater than its moral or physical ambiguity. The appearance of
greater ambiguity is rooted in the fact that our need to interpret the world
religiously is weaker (or not as strongly felt). Its greater ambiguity, in other
worlds, isn't so much the result of how things objectively are (as Hick seems
to suggest) but of how we are subjectively constituted. Why, then, should
those whose need to construct the world religiously is stronger (and hence
find the case for religious belief more plausible) be more impressed by the
world's religious ambiguity than others are by its physical or ethical ambivalence?
Hick apparently thinks they shouldn't. It is rational to trust that the way
things clearly seem to us is the way they are. Although "we cannot prove the
existence of an external world," it is nonetheless reasonable to act "on the
assumption that we inhabit the world that is apparently disclosed to us by our
senses." (213) Those who find their religious experiences compelling are also
entitled to trust them. Their "subjectively firm" religious beliefs are rationally
justified.
I am not sure that this is consistent with Hick's insistence that, from an
objective point of view, the case for religion is neither more nor less compelling than the case for naturalism-that there is evidence for both views and
no standards for weighing it.
It sounds odd to say that the world is physically ambiguous-that there is
no objective reason for interpreting our experience as revealing a world of
independent objects. Why? (1) Our experience seems to present us with such
a world, (2) there are no compelling reasons for thinking that things aren't
the way they seem, and (3) we have a natural disposition to believe in the
reality of a world of independent physical objects.
On the other hand, it doesn't sound odd to speak of the world as religiously
ambiguous. (1) Most religious experiences aren't as compelling as ordinary
perceptual experiences, and some people have no religious experience of any
kind. (2) The only "objective" reason for thinking that there isn't a world of
independent physical objects is the failure of attempts to prove there is. There
appears to be positive evidence, however, of the Real's non-existence (viz.,
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evil). (3) The disposition to believe is weaker in this case, or more easily
stifled. Because of these differences talk of a risk or wager is strained in the
first case but not in the second.
Suppose now that our perceptual experiences were more infrequent and
less compelling, and that fewer people had them. Suppose that there was also
some prima facie evidence for the non-existence of independent physical
objects and that, objectively speaking this evidence was no less compelling
than the evidence for their existence. Certainty would be unwarranted. Even
those whose perceptual experiences are more vivid and compelling should
entertain real doubts. Those with less impressive experiences should be even
more distrustful. It may be rational to rely on one's experiences in these
circumstances. Robust confidence seems out of order. The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to our religious situation. If the world is as
ambiguous as Hick believes, "subjectively firm belief' (159) isn't rationally
appropriate.
2. Hick believes that we can "reasonably claim that our own form of
religious experience .. .is veridical." (235) Because there are no relevant differences between our form of religious experience and those embedded in
other traditions, we must assign them the same validity. However, the phenomenological objects of the various forms of religious experience are different. To preserve these experiences' validity, we must postulate the
Real-in-itself of which the various divine personae and impersonae are phenomenal manifestations.
Hick's Kantianism seems problematic. We can only ascribe "formal properties" to the Real-an-sich. We can say, for example, that the Real has the
property of "being a referent of a term" or "being such that our substantial
characterizations do not apply." We cannot ascribe "substantial properties"
to it "such as 'being good,' 'being powerful', 'having knowledge'," and so
on. (239)
I am not sure that this is consistent with other things Hick says. (1) Hick
believes we veridically experience the Real. But "x veridically experiences
y" entails "y causally acts upon x." We must therefore ascribe causal activity
to the Real-an-sich. Causal activity, however, is a substantial concept. (2)
Hick thinks that "these two very different ways of conceiving and experiencing the Real, as personal and non-personal, is perhaps a complementarity
analogous ... to that between the two ways of conceiving and registering light,
namely as waves and as particles." (245) Suppose that it is. That light sometimes "appears to behave like a shower of particles," and at others "like a
succession of waves" surely tells us something substantive about light itself.
To know that a thing behaves in only some of the logically possible ways a
thing can behave is to know something substantive about it and not just about
its modes or manifestations. Consider now the divine personae. The major
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theistic traditions typically experience the Real as powerful and intelligentnot as weak and foolish. The divine impersonae are never experienced as
powerless or defective. The traditions all experience the divine phenomena
as good and bliss-bestowing. The Real-an-sich does not, in other words,
veridically manifest itself in every logically possible way. Why doesn't this
tell us something substantive about it? (3) Suppose that the Real is veridically
experienced as P. Two theses are possible. According to the first, P can't be
attributed to the Real-as-such if it is also possible to veridically experience
it as non-Po According to the second, no substantive properties can be attributed to the Real. Hick seems to endorse the latter. He says, for example, that
the Real "cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, good or evil,
purposive or non-purposive." (246, my emphasis). The stronger thesis isn't
sufficiently motivated. It also leads to unacceptable consequences.
We were forced to postulate a divine ding-an-sich because the divine phenomena are inconsistent. That the ultimate can be veridically experienced as
personal and non-personal, for example, suggests that the Real-in-itself is
neither. But while Hick thinks the Real is veridically experienced as emptiness and also as a righteous will, he doesn't suggest that it is veridically
experienced as evil. Why, then, can't the substantive concept goodness be
ascribed to it?
Suppose, however, that formal concepts alone can be applied to the ReaIin-itself. Why should we think that "the 'truthfulness' of each tradition is
shown by its soteriological effectiveness" (248)? Hick's discussion of myth
provides an answer. Most distinctively Christian or Buddhist beliefs about
God or emptiness are mythological. They are true if they evoke appropriate
dispositional attitudes to the Real. How do we determine that they do? Given
that the various divine personae and impersonae "are indeed manifestations
of the ultimately Real, an appropriate human response to anyone of them
will also be an appropriate response to the Real." (350) If, for example, our
responses would be appropriate to God if there literally were such a being,
they will be appropriate to the Real.
I don't think this will do. Hick's argument seems to hinge on the following
claim. "If an experience of x is a veridical experience of y, an appropriate
response to x is also an appropriate response to y." This claim is ambiguous,
it might mean "If a person is veridically experiencing y as x, then an appropriate response to x is an appropriate response to y." Or it might mean "If a
person who is experiencing y as x is really experiencing y, then an appropriate
response to x is an appropriate response to y." The latter is false. If I delusively experience our vacuum cleaner as a living creature, I may really be
experiencing our vacuum cleaner. But feelings, attitudes and behavior which
are appropriate responses to an animated machine aren't appropriate responses to our vacuum cleaner. To be true, Hick's claim must be interpreted
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in its first sense. Yet this won't do either. If y is to be veridically experienced
as x, x must surely bear some likeness or analogy to y. On Hick's view, it
can't. Substantive concepts can't be applied to the Real-an-sich in a literal
sense. But neither can they be applied analogically. (Analogical predicates
apply to the divine personae and impersonae. [See page 351.]) When our
language about the Real is emptied of all but formal content, no basis is left
for saying that the Real is verdically experienced as one thing rather than
another and hence for saying that one response to it is more appropriate than
another.
3. Committing oneself in faith to Christ, transcendence of the ego to attain
Nirvana, and so on, "are variations within different conceptual schemes" on
a common theme; "the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness" is the same. (36) Since "the function of postaxial religion is to create contexts within which [this] transformation ... can
take place," "the basic criterion" by which religious systems must be assessed
is "soteriological." (300) The extent to which religions succeed in effecting
this transformation must be judged by the degree to which they succeed in
embodying "the ethical ideal, common to all the great traditions of
agape/karuna (love compassion)." (14) When we apply this criterion we find
that "no one tradition stands out as more productive of sainthood than another." (307)
Are Hick's premises true? Are John Wesley's and D.T. Suzuki's transformations, for example, essentially the same? Only if the specifically Christian
or Buddhist content of their religious lives are accidental to them. It is difficult to believe that they are.
One can raise similar questions about the agape/karuna ideal. The golden
rule is (as Hick argues) a common denominator in post-axial religion but how
this is fleshed out varies. Even when ideals of saintliness are most alike, the
content or flavor of love and compassion seems different. It isn't clear, for
example, that the love of a St. Francis who believes that others are made in
God's image and the compassion of a bodhisattva who believes that people
are "empty" is in all important respects the same.
Hick preserves his thesis by ascribing differences to the common ideal's
being set in different historical contexts. But this seems problematic.
Hick's interpretation of religion is driven by his conviction that the major
traditions are equally authentic responses to the Real. This conviction is
grounded in his belief that they are equally effective in producing salvationfliberation. That belief, in tum, is supported by the claim that the major
traditions come off equally well when assessed by their common ideal. That
they have a common ideal, however, can only be defended by discounting
differences. This is reasonable if and only if the major traditions are equally
appropriate responses to the Real. But that is precisely what is at issue.
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I am not sure, then, that Hick's interpretation of religion is ultimately
persuasive. Nevertheless, this is a rich and rewarding book. It is also an
important one. Hick has shown us why we should be concerned with the issue
of religious pluralism and proposed a thoughtful solution; future work on the
problem will have to take this book into account. I strongly recommend it.

Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays,
ed. by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. Pp. xii + 236, $29.95.
STEPHEN T. DAVIS, Claremont McKenna College
This book contains the final versions of the papers from a conference that
was held at Marquette University on April 14 - 16, 1988. It was an extraordinary and well-attended gathering of both philosophers and theologians. The
aim was to have them communicate with each other on three crucial topics
in Christian theology, viz., Trinity, incarnation, and atonement. Those who
attended the conference will remember being impressed at the uniformly high
quality of the papers, at the energetic discussions they generated, and at the
sense that something important was beginning.
I am delighted to report that the book is excellent; it is a must reading for
anybody who is interested in the theological topics that are considered-or,
indeed, for anybody who is interested in the curious and unexpected recent
movement of Christian philosophers writing about theology (about which I
will say more later). The editors, both of whom are younger theologians of
a Reformed persuasion, are to be commended both for their own fine essays
and for the book as a whole.
The philosophers and theologians who contribute to the book are all somewhat traditional or conservative in their approach to the Christian faith. By
this I mean: (1) all of them take Christian tradition seriously; in their essays
they deal with figures and issues many contemporary theologians ignore; (2)
all appear to agree with Neal Plantinga's comment, "Theological theories
ought to be drawn and elaborated from Scripture" (p. 23); and (3) all end up
affirming (rather than rejecting as outmoded, mythological, or prescientific)
at least some traditional theological formulations.
There are three essays on the Trinity: "Social Trinity and Tritheism," by
Neal Plantinga of Calvin Theological Seminary; "Trinitarian Personhood and
Individuality" by David Brown of Oxford University; and "Trinity and Transcendentals" by Norman Kretzmann of Cornell University. There are noticeable commonalities among the three authors. First, each takes the classical
doctrine of the Trinity seriously and tries to make sense of it in a robust and

